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FROM STATUS TO AGENCY: DEFINING
MIGRANTS
AVINOAM COHEN*
I. MIGRANT CONCEPTIONS AND MIGRANTS’ RIGHTS
Theorists of migration provide a variety of explanations for the phenomenon they study, tracing different causes and motivations for migration.1
Studies focusing on particular migrant groups further complicate the picture
by portraying a wide range of images of “the migrant.”2 Against this
compound reality, the legal characterization of migrants appears dull, even
superficial. However, the law also provides the principal common characteristic that allows us to think and speak collectively of people with markedly
different life experiences.
Migrants share an intricate relationship with the law. Identifying a person
as a migrant implies, in ordinary language, that she has crossed legally
defined territorial boundaries. In legal terminology, invoking the term migrant usually alludes to a particular legal status that entails a specific set of
rights, distinguished from those of the citizen. Acknowledging the role of law
in identifying and classifying people that move across national frontiers,
migrants appear as legal constructs, structured by and within the law.
Regulatory mechanisms designed to direct and control migration are deeply
intertwined with the phenomenon they strive to govern. In itself, this
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1. See DOUGLAS MASSEY, JOAQUIN ARANGO, GRAEME HUGO, ALI KOUAOUCI, ADELLA PELLEGRINO
& EDWARD TAYLOR, WORLDS IN MOTION: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AT THE END OF
THE MILLENNIUM 17-59 (1998) (reviewing contemporary theories of migration). Among contemporary theories of migration, the role of direct legal regulation of migration is often downplayed.
However Massey et al. critically account for the minimal attention that has been given by the standard
literature to the role of states and political actors. Id. at 287-90. Furthermore, it is important to point
out that the law may play a significant role in constructing push and pull factors that do not address
migration directly (such as the structure of markets, labor markets, land division, creation of ethnic
enclaves, etc.).
2. See MICHAEL PETER SMITH & MATT BAKKER, CITIZENSHIP ACROSS BORDERS: THE POLITICAL
TRANSNATIONALISM OF EL MIGRANTE (2008) (discussing translocal political activity of migrants).
Smith and Bakker posit that in this context “el migrante should not be regarded as a single unitary
actor.” Id. at 213.
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circularity is not immanently flawed. Once the constitutive role of law is
exposed, the self-referential nature of legal systems appears to be one of its
inherent characteristics.3 Yet simply recognizing this is insufficient. Specific
rules and standards are generated in light of particular conceptual foundations. Such conceptual underpinnings should be overtly recognized and
scrutinized, given the implicit justification they provide for consequential
normative outcomes.4
For the evaluation of legal classification of migrants, it is important to
understand the role of law in constructing the meaning of “migrants.” As the
identification of migrants becomes commonplace, the concept of the migrant
is distanced from its normative foundations. Understandings of migration are
decoupled from constitutive legal and political decisions that are at the heart
of the normative classification and the regulation of migration proceeds
without accounting for its underlying assumptions.
The conventional discourse on migrants’ rights provides no exception to
this practice. Legal formulations within this realm are often conceived as a
balance between two competing normative commitments: protecting migrants’ rights and preserving states’ privileged sovereignty in core immigration-related matters.5 Different balances are correspondingly contributed to
differences in attitudes towards migrants and the significance ascribed to
each of these commitments. However, attitudes towards migrants already
presuppose conceptions of migrants. Such conceptions are neither value
neutral nor inconsequential. They shape “spaces of possibles” that underlie
attitudes toward migrants and influence the scope and order of substantive
claims for migrants’ rights.6 As opposed to policy choices and substantive
rules concerning migration, which are usually subject to multifaceted normative debates, the constitutive elements and their conceptual underpinnings are
normally ignored.7 Seldom is the meaning infused within the objects of

3. Cf. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 13-46 (1993) (considering the
self-referential nature of law and terms under which it would be considered a self-producing,
maintaining and defining autopoietic system).
4. Cf. ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF PENAL JUSTICE 5-8,
36-37 (2009) (arguing in the context of criminal law, that different conceptions of freedom generate
different justifications for applying force to the individual).
5. For the idea of a dual commitment, see SEYLA BENHABIB, RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS,
RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 2-4 (2006).
6. The “space of possible” is a term borrowed from PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF CULTURAL
PRODUCTION: ESSAYS ON ART AND LITERATURE 30-32, 177 (1993). Obviously, and perhaps more
importantly, the term denotes the space of impossibles.
7. In a closely related context, conceptions of citizenship were not exempted from scrutiny. Such
inquiries, usually originating within the burgeoning literature on citizenship in other disciplines, have
already made their way into legal scholarship. See Herman van Gunsteren, Four Conceptions of
Citizenship, in THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP 36, 43-48 (Bart Van Steenbergen ed., 1994) (critiquing
the three traditional conceptions of citizenship and proposing “to build a conception of citizenship
that is meaningful for the present day” Id. at 44); ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD
IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (1992) (generally exploring how “conceptions of nationhood . . . have
determined the tracks along which the politics of citizenship has been driven” in France and
Germany. Id. at 17); Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 447,
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migration regulation considered a subject for a reflective normative discussion. It is here that circularity risks turning vicious. The legal regulation of
migration and membership could be legitimated by particular conceptions of
migrants that regulation, perhaps inadvertently, inculcates.
*
Conceptions of migrants, as they will be addressed in the following
discussion, are perspectives through which migrants are conceived and
understood. These conceptions are hybrids, partly rooted in factual observations about migrants and migration, and partly in legal and political convictions.8 Providing the difficulty of achieving a general and consistent descriptive image of “the migrant,” normative elements acquire particular salience.
Adopting a certain conception of migrants involves a consideration of what is
it about migration that allows us to group together a specific set of human
experiences and apply to them a specific arsenal of regulatory mechanisms
and normative justifications.9 The choice embedded in the conception is
twofold: it combines a focus on particular facets of a complex and fragmented reality with a normative prism that ascribes meaning and significance
to these observations. These elements, although categorically distinct, are
closely interlaced. In emphasizing the normative presuppositions embedded
in conceptions of migrants, the present discussion holds that differences in
normative choices often correspond to different outlooks on the reality of
migration.10 Keeping in mind the variety of images available to describe
migration, an evaluation of the constitutive role of law seeks to open the
discussion at a point often overlooked.11

453-88 (2000) (exploring various discourses and dimensions of citizenship). Unlike the citizen, the
migrant is rarely conceived as a legal or political concept and the availability of different migrant
conceptions is largely ignored.
8. Note that, in this respect, the use of conceptions in the literature varies, and often depends on
the focus and orientation of study. The conception of nationhood for Brubaker, who looks at “cultural
idioms,” supra note 7, at 9-17, is different from the use of conceptions of citizenship for Bosniak,
identifying alternative conceptions within political theory, supra note 7, at 449-50, 464. The use of
conceptions in the present discussion is more closely related to the normative emphasis of the latter.
9. I therefore speak of conceptions, not concepts of migrants. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 5-6 (rev. ed. 1999) (marking the difference between a concept of justice, reflecting common
notions about the social function of just institutions, and the various conceptions of justice that
interpret and substantiate the concept through different principles determining the allocation of rights
and duties or specifying what division of social advantages would be considered just).
10. There is an intricate interplay between the constitutive and the reflective role of law in this
respect, as normative presuppositions may both reflect and frame (or constitute) the images of what
would be perceived as the “reality” of migration. A more nuanced elaboration of this point merits a
separate inquiry that is outside the scope of this discussion. Cf. Guy Mundlak & Hila Shamir, Between
Intimacy and Alienage: The Legal Constitution of Domestic & Care Work in the Welfare State, in
MIGRATION AND DOMESTIC WORK: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE ON A GLOBAL THEME 161 (Helma Lutz
ed., 2008) (demonstrating the dual role of law as both reflective and constitutive in the context of
domestic care workers in Israel).
11. In discussing the constitutive approach to the study of law, Garth & Sarat claim that “[p]art of
the politics of law . . . involves who controls definitions and categories . . . particular categories and
assumptions, generally taken for granted in the law, may limit the possibilities of those whose lives
are shaped by the law. Progressive struggle for social change . . . comes in part through resistance and
transformation of seemingly taken-for-granted categories and terms.” Bryant G. Garth & Austin
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The boundaries of the conventional “space of possibles,” within which
migration regulation is perceived, are not fixed. Probing them can potentially
assist in redrawing a map that includes alternatives formerly unnoticed.
Through a critical reconsideration of the conceptual basis for regulating
migration, fleshing out under-discussed normative foundations, a gap in the
evaluation and justification of migration regulation can be filled. This view
maintains that migration is a legal and political concept, where migrants are
conceived through their political and legal status (or lack thereof) and not
merely as an extra-political sociological phenomenon. A normative assessment of the legal regulation of migration should not be confined to the
strictures of one single conception of migrants.
The remainder of the discussion unfolds in three parts. Part II explores the
commonly held status-based conception of migrants. Part III introduces an
alternative agency-based conception of migrants. Part IV concludes by
discussing the normative ramifications of the proposed distinction between
status- and agency-based conceptions, focusing on the challenging attempt to
define migrants within the law, through the proposed definition included in
the draft International Migrants Bill of Rights (IMBR).
II. THE STATUS-BASED CONCEPTION OF MIGRANTS
As the forces behind migration vary, so do the goals of regulating
migration and the interests involved. Issues ranging from economic needs to
identity politics drive the regulation of migration in different directions. At
times, the regulation of migration may even be a side affect of processes that
would seem to have little to do with migrants in the first place.12 Yet while the
reasons for addressing migrants within the law are diverse, the conceptions
of migrants reflected by the law are not. Migration regulation largely posits a
similar conception of migrants, based on migrants’ distinct legal status. The
complexity of migration is eventually narrowed down even where the law
applies to migrants rather tacitly. When social security or employment laws
apply differently to migrants, it is usually their status that makes the
difference. In other contexts, reference to status is more clear and explicit, as
where laws governing migration and membership are particularly designed
to allocate or impose legal status.13 Overall, migrants earn a distinctive place

Sarat, Studying How Law Matters, in HOW DOES LAW MATTER 1, 8 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat
eds., 1998).
12. Objectives ranging from the regulation of domestic secondary labor markets to controlling
ethnic conflicts were identified as instigators of migration regulation. See generally MICHAEL PIORE,
BIRDS OF PASSAGE: MIGRANT LABOR IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (1979) (developing the segmented
market theory); ADRIANA KEMP & REBECCA RAIJMAN, MIGRANTS AND WORKERS: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF LABOR MIGRATION IN ISRAEL (2008) (demonstrating how introducing migrant workers to
the Israeli labor market serves as a mechanism of controlling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).
13. “Legal status” is used here in the realm of citizenship and migration and is not endemic to this
context. Rights instruments, for instance, refer to status in a variety of contexts. When Sir Maine
famously wrote, “the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from
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within the law by holding an impaired legal status.14
A. The Status-Based Conception from a Rights-Centered Perspective
A status-based conception of migrants does not necessarily coincide with a
positive approach towards the impact of legal status on the condition of
migrants and the realities of their lives. On the contrary, its prominence in
framing legal approaches towards migrants is repeatedly challenged. Critics
express concern over the role of status in entrenching arbitrary or unjust
distinctions among persons,15 and rights-centered legal instruments expressly reject status-based discrimination.16 Qualified legal status is often
seen from this perspective as migrants’ main vulnerability. Yet a closer look
reveals that the structural logic of status could be reproduced even when
status-based distinctions are rejected. Assumptions regarding the hierarchy
of status, or the notion that status is a classification imposed or confirmed by
higher echelons of power, are not confined to regulation that is explicitly
status-based. Foundational elements of legal status can be traced even within
approaches that overtly reject status-based distinctions as the key for specifying rights and privileges.
The endeavor to enhance the legal protection of migrants outside their
societies of origin, using the language of rights, usually proceeds within one
of two main approaches. One approach invokes an extended conception of
citizenship to assert that persons may be afforded certain rights despite the
lack of formal status citizenship. A second approach seeks to supplant status
with personhood. Both approaches, whether formulating their claims in the
language of citizenship or personhood, appear at first sight to go beyond the
formal categories of legal status. Only status remains backstage, maintaining

Status to Contract,” his notion of status was considerably different. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW 151 (cheap ed. 1918) (emphasis original). Citizenship is, however, increasingly a locus for
maintaining status based distinctions, as demonstrated by the Convention on the Rights of the Child
art. 2, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCRC]. The language, originally included to
prohibit discrimination of children born out of wedlock, now also provides for equal treatment of
non-citizen children. See infra note 16.
14. Some migrants, such as women and children, are often exposed to multiple vulnerabilities
and in some respects may share material similarities with non-migrant equivalents. Nevertheless, the
particular interplay of other vulnerabilities with migrants’ qualified legal status usually renders them
in a materially different reality. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Note, A License To Abuse: The Impact
of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L.J. 1401, 1402-04 (1993) (discussing how
conditional status makes many female immigrants in the U.S. vulnerable to physical abuse).
15. For a discussion of the inequalities of birth-right citizenship, see Ayelet Shachar & Ran
Hirscl, Citizenship as Inherited Property, 35 POL. THEORY 253 (2007) (comparing the justifications of
property and membership regimes); AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND
GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009) (suggesting a principle of membership acquisition that is based on the
genuine connection of persons to states).
16. The original draft version of the UNCRC included a provision granting alien children equal
rights. Moreover, an attempt by the United States to limit the scope of the convention to children
legally within a state’s jurisdiction was rejected outright. The special provision for migrants’ children
was dropped in order to prevent limiting the grounds of prohibited discrimination. See THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” 141
(Sharon Detrick ed., 1992).
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its decisive function in the construction of migrants’ rights within the law.
The extensive literature on citizenship offers various understandings of
what citizenship is and what it should stand for. Whether by an emphasis on
the imperatives of social inclusion, the importance of civic engagement and
direct participation, or by emphasis on the role of identity, “thick” or
“substantial” conceptions of citizenship are contrasted with the “thin” conception of status citizenship.17 In fact, migrants can be seen as beneficiaries of
the critique of status citizenship that attempts to recast its meaning and
expand its reach. Their continual presence in host countries served as an
impetus for new formulations of citizenship, both in theory and practice.18
Conceiving migrants through the prism of citizenship reinforces a statusbased conception of migrants. This is evident when theorists, who regard
“thick” conceptions of citizenship as superior to a “thin” status-based
conception, still relate to the (thin) status-based conception as the kernel of
citizenship.19 Even for alternative views that do not regard formal legal status
as citizenship’s sine qua non, the idea of citizenship for migrants largely
encapsulates the foundational elements of a status-based order: (a) it retains
the hierarchical (and exclusionary) character of assigned legal status20 and
(b) it generally presupposes that citizenship extends from within. That is,
citizenship is conferred on migrant newcomers by persons who already
belong to an established citizenry.21
Replacing the terminology of citizenship with personhood is sometimes
read as an effort to transcend the exclusionary nature of the former and avoid
statist (or communitarian) concerns that yield status-based inequalities. For
migrants, however, the difference between the approaches is not as palpable.
Using personhood as the basis for allocating rights usually corresponds to a

17. For a discussion and criticism of the “thick/thin duality,” see Linda Bosniak, Citizenship,
Noncitizenship, and the Transnationalization of Domestic Work, in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES:
CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER 127, 141-44 (Seyla Benhabib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009).
18. Saskia Sassen, The Repositioning of Citizenship and Alienage: Emergent Subjects and Spaces
for Politics, 2 GLOBALIZATIONS 79, 85-86 (2005); YASEMIN NAHOĞLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP:
MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE 65-83 (1994); and see generally RAINER
BAUBÖCK, TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP AND RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
(1994). In fact, in defining the boundaries of conventional political membership, migrants (and
aliens) have frequently assumed the role of the citizens’ others. See Linda K. Kerber, The Stateless as
the Citizen’s Other: A View from the United States, in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP,
BORDERS, AND GENDER 76 (Seyla Benhabib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009). See also the term “alien” in
the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which
They Live, G.A. Res. 40/144, annex, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 252, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (Dec.
13, 1985).
19. Bosniak, supra note 17, at 143 (“The usual assumption is that the status of citizenship is a
necessary precondition for the enjoyment of citizenship in its more substantive and robust versions.”).
20. See Linda Bosniak, The Citizenship of Aliens, 56 SOCIAL TEXT 29, 31-32 (1998) (remarking
on the desirability of “giving up on citizenship as an aspirational project altogether” given that it
“conveys a deeply exclusionary and parochial message”).
21. Cf. Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007)
(suggesting that membership in transnational labor unions could become a ticket for entering local
labor markets).
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thinner layer of rights. Core instruments of international human rights law,
despite their general claim for universal application, are generally careful to
provide some significant qualifications in their application to persons lacking
formal citizenship status.22 In curtailing rights as a consequence of broadened personal application, the determinative role of status is implicitly
acknowledged and migrants are singled out on account of their legal status.23
Within the ambit of a dual normative commitment, universalism and personhood may be distanced from bounded concepts of status and citizenship, but
remain in their shadow.24 Concurrently, lack of status remains a cornerstone
of the legal characterization of the condition of migrants and is perceived as
migrants’ main weakness.
The two distinct approaches to increase the legal protection of migrants are
similarly structured. They follow a pattern of enhancing rights, premised on
the decisiveness of legal status by drawing circles of inclusion and guaranteed rights that are dependent upon achieving the necessary status. Both
envision assimilating the migrant into the citizen as the ultimate remedy for
migrants’ vulnerability. Regardless of different, even contrasting conceptions
of citizenship, these approaches consider legal status to be the key for
defining the acceptable reach of rights and corollary state obligations. Ideally,
being a migrant should be a temporary state of transition that ceases upon
receiving citizenship, or conversely, upon return to a state of citizenship.
Migration under this conception is viewed as an attribute that should be shed
on the way to enhancing one’s rights. Formal legal status may be eschewed as
a backward measure of distinction among persons, but its basic architecture
remains. The distinctiveness of migrants is characterized by and within the
law through legal status, which becomes at once a measure of distinction and
its own counter-measure. This dialectic role of legal status is illustrated by
international instruments aimed at protecting persons that do not enjoy a
22. See e.g. the interpretation of the ICCPR provided in Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, Reported in 1 Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 189 ¶ 3, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (May 27, 2008). In disregarding status completely there is probably more of
a wishful universalism than a solid account of obligatory international human rights law. See
RYSZARD C HOLEWINSKI , M IGRANT WORKERS IN I NTERNATIONAL H UMAN R IGHTS L AW : T HEIR
P ROTECTION IN C OUNTRIES OF E MPLOYMENT 40-76 (1997) (discussing the standard interpretation
and application of international human rights law instruments on migrants and concluding that
“[a]lthough international human rights norms possess an ’all-embracing’ approach with the objective
of protecting all human beings, expectations that they would greatly raise the protection of aliens
above that afforded by the vague and rudimentary minimum standard of traditional law have not been
fulfilled.” Id. at 76) (emphasis original).
23. Proponents of a human rights approach to migrants’ rights often call for equal application of
human rights on citizens and non-citizens alike. Cf. Ryszard Cholewinski, The Human and Labor
Rights of Migrants: Visions of Equality, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 177, 179-80 (2008) (discussing the
present state of protection of migrant workers in international law, particularly the major UN human
rights and ILO conventions).
24. Full fledged cosmopolitanism that disregards national borders in one way or another, may
escape this problem, but runs into others. Realization of this utopia would arguably require a new
concept of migration, as basic ideas about migration as we know them, may well become obsolete.
Exposition of such ideas is however well outside the scope of the present paper.
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protective citizenship status. Both the Refugee Convention25 and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness26 clearly imply that in the current state
of affairs, only states can assure the full range of human rights to their formal
citizens.27
The implicit endorsement of a status-based conception by rights-centered
approaches coincides with state-centered approaches to migration regulation,
which are otherwise clearly distinguished. Domestic courts repeatedly confirm the sovereignty of states through their rulings in matters of migration,
sustaining states’ authority to determine and confer legal status.28 States’
struggle against irregular migration provides another substantiation of the
statist preoccupation with status and legality of migrants.29 This concurrence,
often reported in the general context of migration policy and regulation,30 is
not entirely unexpected. The shared conception is, however, more than a
mere coalition of interests. It represents a coalescence of normative presuppositions that embeds status in the common understanding of how migrants can
be addressed by and within the law.
B. Normative Underpinnings of the Status-based Conception
The status-based conception is the conventional wisdom about what is
significant in the relationship of migrants with the law. This process, by
which a status-based conception becomes commonplace and considered the
standard perception of migrants, is reinforced by considerations that highlight its normative advantages. First, there is a sovereignty consideration: a
status-based conception is conveniently reconcilable with a view that accepts
the sovereign prerogative in regulating migration. Second, there is a categori-

25. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. Notably, the
obligation of states under international refugee law is to provide refugees surrogate protection,
effectively replacing the persecuting sovereign with a benevolent one.
26. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175.
27. This idea echoes Arendt’s criticism of the prewar human rights and asylum regime and the
idea that only citizens have an effective “right to have rights” that only sovereign states can secure.
See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 290-302 (Harcourt 1976) (1950). Benhabib
concludes in this respect that “Arendt took the framework of the nation-state . . . as a given.”
BENHABIB, supra note 5, at 64. Indeed, even in accounts of society in the globalizing world, such as
Sassen’s, “[t]he national remains a referent in [the] work.” SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY,
RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 306, 422-23 (2006). In this respect, one can
clearly see how commonly propagated goals of immigration policy that are framed in terms of
reducing (or, ideally, eliminating) situations of lack of status can become a double-edged sword.
28. Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign Law by National
Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L. L. 241, 262-67 (2008) (showing how asylum courts coordinate their
interpretation of the refugee convention, thus shielding their respective governments from external
intervention).
29. The additional protocols to the Palermo Convention clearly illustrate this phenomenon. See
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, GA Res. 55/25, annex III, U.N. GAOR, 55th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 65, UN Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (Nov. 15, 2000).
30. ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF
AMERICA 8 (2006) (accounting for the significance of “strange bedfellow” coalitions in shaping
American immigration policy).
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zation consideration: a status-based conception offers a workable device for
classification that allows the law to administer and justify the extension of
rights to migrants. These considerations differ in their explicit reasoning,
particularly with regards to the value attached to preserving statist control
over migration. At the same time, the considerations are interconnected and
mutually reinforce one another, coming far closer together than what would
initially appear.
In matters of migration, the sovereignty consideration is overt and normally presented directly. Proponents of stronger versions seek to preserve
independent state control over migration policy and regulation. In its radical
account, the very use of universal human rights in the domestic arena of
migration policy is questioned. Weaker versions of this argument are captured by the idea of a dual normative commitment, balancing migrants’ rights
against the obligation to uphold state sovereignty. Thus fashioned, this
tension is difficult to reconcile. A formula that would be acceptable to
receiving states seems to require concessions that undermine the concomitant
purpose of enhancing migrants’ legal protection.31 Some commentators even
question the very possibility of achieving any coherent equilibrium in this
context.32 Available examples appear to restate this quandary, as illustrated
by the experience of the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW).33
In practice, coming to terms with the tension between State sovereignty and
migrant rights within one comprehensive framework involves subtle work to
consider respective and contrasting claims. An emphasis on migrants’ status
can serve to strike a balance between the conflicting normative commitments
by reaffirming the primacy of sovereign interests, while maintaining that
migrants’ rights considerations extend within limits prescribed by status.
International human rights instruments largely follow this rational, but
without openly admitting that status-based distinctions are benign or that the
universality of rights is ancillary to sovereignty. After all, rights-centered
legal mechanisms are heavily dependent upon and vitalized by state imple-

31. Suppose for our present purpose that no discrepancy exists between real and declared goals of
migrant protection. Nevertheless, one should certainly not assume that the “myth of rights” is
inexistent in the context of migration. This problem will, however, not be addressed in the present
discussion.
32. See PHILIP COLE, PHILOSOPHIES OF EXCLUSION: LIBERAL POLITICAL THEORY AND IMMIGRATION
202 (2000) (concluding his discussion of liberal democratic theory, finding that “as it is presently
constituted, liberal theory cannot provide a justification for membership control and remain a
coherent political philosophy”). For Cole, the deficit is ingrained in liberal political theory itself.
33. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter ICRMW]. Although 20
years have passed since the ICRMW was adopted by the UN General Assembly, I suggest that it is too
early to speak of its failure. In terms of major destination states in the developed world ratifying the
ICRMW, the forecast remains grim. Yet, the conceptual shield of state sovereignty has certainly been
penetrated by the international human rights discourse. Counting ratifications may be indicative, but
should definitely not be considered as the sole criterion for evaluating impact and success.
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mentation.34
Against the political backdrop in which migration is situated, identifying
and distinguishing migrants through their legal and political status seems
inevitable. Yet the political moment at which status is made central to the
architecture of migration regulation is obscured, overlooking the function of
migrants (and migration generally) in constructing state sovereignty.35 The
status-based conception of migrants masks the role of law and legal status in
distinguishing migrants from citizens and in creating distinct subgroups of
migrants. Leaving these constitutive political decisions underexplored, the
status-based conception narrows down the image of migrants to their
capacity to bear and acquire legal status.
Moving to a comparatively instrumental view of sovereignty leads us to a
second set of considerations, concerned with a general tendency for categorization. In a recent attempt to put together an International Migrants Bill of
Rights (IMBR),36 drafters and commentators struggled with questions similar to those reflected by the nuanced definition clause included in the
ICRMW. An intricate web of international mechanisms and domestic laws
already provides an important set of legal protections for migrants, including
some acknowledged classifications that provide some migrants relatively
strong legal protections. This is not a unique trait of migration law; the
fragmentary and piecemeal manner that frequently characterizes legal development often explains why different categories emerge, evolve and overlap.
Legal devices are not easily abandoned, and in reality, even qualified legal
status may be significantly instrumental for migrants. The daily practice of
immigration law in many jurisdictions provides numerous examples of
migrants seeking to qualify for recognized legal classifications in attempts to
acquire some measure of legal protection. Simply adhering to a longstanding
practice does not in and of itself provide a sufficient justification for holding
categorical distinctions among migrants. Yet even within a rights-centered
perspective that is overtly suspicious of status-based distinctions, there
remains a number of compelling arguments in favor of sustaining the legal
categorization of migrants.

34. Indeed, proponents of a rights-centered approach often opt for state-centered mechanisms.
See generally James F. Hollifield, The Politics of International Migration: How Can We “Bring the
State Back In”?, in MIGRATION THEORY: TALKING ACROSS DISCIPLINES 137 (Caroline B. Brettell &
James Hollifield eds., 2000); Peter Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1999).
Arendt’s idea of “the right to have rights” is also particularly compelling here. See ARENDT, supra
note 27. This idea is further developed in MARGARET R. SOMERS, GENEALOGIES OF CITIZENSHIP:
MARKETS, STATELESSNESS, AND THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS 63–117 (2008).
35. Categorizing migrants in terms of their status solidifies states’ sovereign authority to classify
and regulate (or irregulate) migration. Exclusion and inclusion are often performed emblematically,
as definitive acts of sovereignty. See ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE
AND GERMANY 1–17 (1992). When even critical liberal thinkers concede that migration remains a
stronghold of sovereignty, they flesh out the constitutive role of migration for sovereignty itself. See
CHAIM GANS, THE LIMITS OF NATIONALISM 130–47 (2003).
36. IMBR Network, International Migrants Bill of Rights: Draft in Progress, 24 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 399 (2010).
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First, within a system structured through legal status, carving out statusbased categories to protect migrants is a practical necessity. An incremental
approach values recognized categories of protection, however partial and
fragmented. It maintains that progressing through acknowledged categories
would enjoy the best prospect of adoption and compliance by states, or, to put
it less crudely, enhance the possibility of reaching a better and wider
consensus. Advocacy campaigns that appeal to courts, state politics, or both,
are expected to apply accepted terminology and utilize existing categories
together with a shared status-based conception of migrants.37 This is a
cautious approach, sensitive to the political economy of determining boundaries of status. In practicing restraint, it is careful of becoming counterproductive or creating a backlash. Such concerns are not ungrounded, as stretching
the boundaries of recognized status occasionally increases state suspicion
over the eligibility of claims for status.38 Facing state resistance, a sensible
strategy for migrants’ advocates appears to be to work within existing
categories, without upsetting them. The widening interpretation of the
definition of “refugee” illustrates some benefits of an incremental approach.39 Furthermore, even when states are mobilized to grant status to
(some) migrants or reform their immigration laws, the basic scheme of status
remains intact. This is a positive spillover of citizenship status. Securing
migrants with a status akin to citizenship is said to provide legal protection
that is perhaps shy of full citizenship, but shares some of its core basic rights
vis-à-vis the State.
Second, it appears that clear and narrow legal categories would prevent
diluting the protection afforded to eligible migrants. Echoing the “rights vs.
numbers” problem fashioned in the migration literature, there appears an
inevitable trade-off between the numbers of migrants a state can absorb and
the scope of rights (and corollary obligations) it can be expected to grant.40
The practice of balancing rights against numbers is not always made explicit,
but is often difficult to ignore.41 Instead of reaching a one-size-fit-all
compromise between rights and numbers, narrower categories allow states to

37. See, e.g., Mimi Ajzenstadt, Judicialization, Neo-Liberalism and Foreign Workers in Israel, 9
INT’L REV. CONSTITUTIONALISM 107 (2009) (providing a detailed case study of a leading Israeli labor
and migrants rights NGO).
38. See, e.g., MATHEW J. GIBNEY & RANDALL HANSEN, IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM: FROM 1900 TO
THE PRESENT 223 (2005) (mentioning the example of concern about bogus family unification claims).
Obviously, similar examples abound.
39. See EMMA HADDAD, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNS 23-46
(2008) (discussing the widening definition of refugees).
40. Martin Ruhs & Philip Martin, Number vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest Worker Programs, 42
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 249 (2008).
41. In recent years, discussion regarding the naturalization of children of migrant workers has
been high on the Israeli political agenda, with numerous, explicit references to such considerations
across the media and within parliamentary debates. See Adriana Kemp, Managing Migration,
Reprioritizing National Citizenship: Undocumented Migrant Workers’ Children and Policy Reforms
in Israel, 8 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 663, 680-83 (2007) (accounting for the “politics of numbers” that
were considered crucial in debates over naturalization).
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specify a different set of rights to discrete classes of migrants according to
their relative needs.42 Drafters of the IMBR were concerned that a catchall
definition of migrants may be considered over-demanding and ultimately
weaken the bill, either ending with a diminished scope of its provisions or
limiting its appeal to states. The drafters suspected that adopting a broad
category of migrants would blur acknowledged classifications and eliminate
relevant status-based distinctions.43 Is it justified to collapse the distinction
between regular and irregular migrants? Ought the established difference
between migrants and refugees (or other categories of forced migrants) be
tagged as irrelevant and disregarded? As these questions surface, the practice
of upholding status-based categories reveals its compound character through
a tacit reiteration of the status-based conception. These questions share an
understanding that it is justified to distinguish categories of migrants who are
more deserving or have particularly dire needs and to develop correspondingly different standards of protection. Erasing such distinctions, already
recognized by an elaborated system of classification and allocation of legal
status, is arguably no less arbitrary than maintaining them. Rather, it is status
that offers a middle ground where conflicting perspectives can both compete
and meet.
Describing the propensity to think of migrants within the law through
categories of legal status does not undermine its practical relevance. Presently, when status citizenship serves as a legitimate basis for distinction and
lack of status often has concrete detrimental consequences, status remains an
important factor and a practical goal for migrants. For many migrants, a
secured legal status is valuable in preventing harm or exploitation. The
positive effects of status can nevertheless become blind spots if we fail to see
their inherent limitations and consider alternatives.
C. The Status-Based Conception Reevaluated
While a status-based conception provides a point of convergence for the
competing views on migration policy issues entrenched in common legal
practice, it is also necessary to consider some important objections to
adopting the status-based conception as the standard perspective for addressing migrants within the law.
First, a reevaluation should begin by recognizing the political and norma-

42. Generally speaking, narrow categories may be better suited to provide accurate legal rules.
This discussion hints however that in the context of migration, the consequences of categorization
and the problems of over- and under-inclusivity may work differently. Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Legal
Realism and the Taxonomy of Private Law (Tel Aviv University Legal Working Paper Series, Tel Aviv
University Law Faculty Papers, Working Paper No. 38. October 26, 2006), available at http://
law.bepress.com/taulwps/fp/art38 (arguing that realist taxonomies are sensitive to context and seek to
generate relatively narrow legal categories). As this issue requires a separate discussion, it will not be
pursued here.
43. The definition of migrants adopted by the IMBR is discussed in Part IV, below.
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tive decisions embedded in established categories of legal status. The
function of status in making the political decision commonplace, already
discussed above, has several representations in practice. The definition of
refugees—with its exclusion of internally displaced persons, or forced
migrants who are not persecuted, and the mechanisms for sharing responsibility among states—are instructive in this respect.44 Conditioning working
permits in employment by specific employers, and designating migrants as
irregular for leaving their employers, provide further examples.45 Narrow
definitions, in this context, shape the scope of protected vulnerabilities. There
is often little to justify intrinsically the existing criteria to distinguishing
between an undocumented migrant from a recognized refugee, or an irregular
migrant from a visa worker. Genuine concerns regarding particular needs and
vulnerabilities may be at play, but they are obfuscated by a wide assortment
of realpolitik policy preferences. Legally and politically constructed categories of migrants, produced by a differential legal status regime, cannot stand
in for any form of organic community.
Second, standard normative justifications supporting a status-based classification system are weakened by practices that undermine their reasoning.
Constructing an agreed taxonomy of status-based distinctions does not
foretell state practice within these boundaries. States may acknowledge
privileged categories of migrants, such as refugees or children, while
simultaneously raising procedural or substantial barriers, and ultimately
dismissing claims for legal protection on contingent, individual grounds.46
Similarly, doubting the eligibility of particular claimants can disguise principled doubts in the legitimacy of migrants’ claims.47 The legitimizing effect
of recognized legal status may prove only marginally beneficial for migrants,

44. See Andrew E. Shacknove, Who Is a Refugee?, 95 ETHICS 274 (1985) (critically discussing
the moral relevance of politically based distinctions ingrained in the Refugee Convention).
45. Such a practice was partly ruled out by the Israeli Supreme Court in HCJ 4542/02 Kav
LaOved Worker’s Hotline v. Gov’t of Israel [2006] (1) IsrLR (1) 260.
46. Drawing again from the Israeli experience, after a special commission for evaluating visa
requests on humanitarian grounds was established, it was severely criticized for operating without
any guidelines and rejecting nearly all the requests it received. See, e.g., the decision of the Tel Aviv
District Court, sitting as an administrative court, in AA 1952/07 Carati v. State of Israel (Unreported)
(2009) (Isr.). The practice of the governmental asylum commission in Israel provided similar results,
rejecting the decisive majority of claims it reviewed. In its review of the domestic asylum process, the
Israel Comptroller found that between the years 2000–2007, only 1.3% of the asylum claimants
received official recognition as refugees. See Comptroller Report 58B for the Year 2007 and the
Fiscal Year 2006, Vol. 1 105 (2008) (Hebrew), available at: http://www.mevaker.gov.il/serve/
contentTree.asp?bookid⫽514&id⫽190&contentid⫽&parentcid⫽undefined&sw⫽1024&hw⫽698.
Completing the picture, the numbers of those who received temporary protection without a formal
status was greater manifold. See Tally Kritzman-Amir, “Otherness” as the Underlying Principle in
Israel’s Asylum Regime, 42 ISR. L. REV. 603, 617-20 (2010) (describing the Israeli practice of
extending temporary group protection to asylum seekers).
47. See, e.g., Avinoam Cohen, Lone Children in the Shadow of Immigration Law: Considering
Domestic Law in Light of International Human Rights Law, in CHILDREN RIGHTS AND ISRAELI LAW
347, 372-82 (Tamar Morag ed., 2010) (Hebrew) (discussing such a phenomenon in the context of
claims for protection made by unaccompanied migrant children, where the age of claimants is often
disputed).
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while the state-centered structure of the status-based order is reaffirmed. As
long as states and sovereignty are only instrumentally valued, such an
outcome is disconcerting.
Third, and most significant, is the inadequate account of migration that the
status-based conception can offer. Indeed, it should be admitted outright that
opportunities and constraints generated by the law are part of a complex web
of “push and pull factors” that shape realities and trends of transnational
migration.48 The limits of legal concepts and conceptions in providing
accurate representations of the experience of migrants should not, however,
discourage the attempt to improve their fit.49 Only here, the appropriateness
of applying a status-based categorization should be questioned. The unidimensional imagery of migrants posited by the status-based conception neglects
some characteristics of migrants that could possibly make a difference in
migration regulation.
The normative considerations evaluated so far explain both why the
categorization of migrants is practically necessary and why utilizing statusbased categories is reasonable, but these considerations come short of
explaining why categories of migrants must be conceived in terms of legal
status. Missing from this exposition is the possibility of non-status-based
categories.
III.

AN AGENCY-BASED CONCEPTION OF MIGRANTS

The ICRMW begins a movement away from status-based conceptions. In
line with the conventions concerning stateless migrants and refugees, it
acknowledges the significance of legal status and even strives to reduce
irregularity as one of its proclaimed goals.50 Still, within this recognized
framework and despite an emphasis on the universality of its provisions, it
eventually submits that distinctions among migrants in regular and irregular

48. Institutional approaches explaining migration tend to put law at the center stage, yet this is
only one of many sociological explanations for the phenomenon of migration. Compare, e.g., Kitty
Calavita, Immigration, Law, and Marginalization in a Global Economy: Notes from Spain, 32 L. &
SOC. REV. 529 (1998) and KEMP & RAIJMAN, supra note 12, at 40, with MASSEY ET AL., supra note 1
(in which legal factors make little appearance). It should, however, be noted that sociological theories
of migration, such as the segmented labor market theory proposed by Piore, supra note 12,
presuppose an infrastructure of states and differential legal status. Truth in this respect is considerably dependent upon the eyes (and discipline) of the beholder.
49. Cf. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. R.
809, 826 (1935) (sarcastically criticizing the theoretical use of concepts and conceptions that is
decoupled from their practical consequences). Without blunting the edge of his critique, for the
present discussion it should be noted that Cohen uses concepts and conceptions rather indistinguishably.
50. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93, Preamble, art. 68. In a similar vein, the
additional protocols to the Palermo Convention on the Suppression of Organized Crime attracted
criticism for focusing on the illegality of trafficking in persons or smuggling of migrants and
including relatively weak protections to the (migrant) victims of these crimes. See, e.g., Jacqueline
Bhabha, Lone Travelers: Rights, Criminalization, and the Transnational Migration of Unaccompanied Children, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 269, 292-93 (2000).
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conditions are relevant and consequential. However, there is another voice
present. The ICRMW accentuates various difficulties encountered by migrants; it stipulates that migrants’ vulnerabilities are not merely derivatives of
legal status or lack thereof.51
What can be read in the ICRMW is a wider concern with the human
experience of migrants. Although it fails to realize the full breadth of this idea
and ultimately aligns with the rules governing status, it supplies the seeds for
a conceptual shift. Against the rigid understanding of migrants that is focused
on one specific aspect of their condition, it offers a thicker account of
migrants’ vulnerability. True, this is a relatively minor divergence from the
conventional image of migrants’ vulnerability, but it at least hints at an
underexplored path.
Unlike the migrant, its counterpart citizen was far more successful in
attracting scholarly imagination. Citizenship maintained the prospect of
being construed positively through more inclusive conceptualizations. It is
therefore commended even by observers who remain sensitive to the innate
exclusionary consequences of defining those who belong.52 As the concept of
citizenship was rehabilitated and its conceptions thickened, citizenship as
status served increasingly as a mere point of departure.53 For such evolving
conceptions, citizenship stands for more than its formal legal attributes. What
would be a similarly thick conception of migrants that addresses migration
more richly and positively?
Answering this question should probably begin with Rawls’ claim that, in
a well-ordered world, there would be no migration.54 This claim succinctly
expresses the core problem. In a state-ordered world, migration has strong
negative connotations. Highlighting migrants’ vulnerability, marginality and
political incapacity coincides with this idea and explains why migration is
regarded as a transnational phenomenon and personal attribute to be overcome. Yet the assumption that societies are better off without migration and
people are better off not migrating, ascribes to an unnecessarily narrow
conception of migrants. A different and insightful coalescence of underlying
presuppositions about migrants yields a radically different imagery. Between
the emerging model of migration and development, and a state-centered
perspective that is more reluctant about migration, there appears another

51. The ICRMW mentions, inter alia, vulnerabilities owed generally to migrant workers’
“absence from their State of origin,” ICRMW Preamble, ¶ 9, or other outcomes of migration such as
the “scattering of the family,” ICRMW Preamble, ¶ 11.
52. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP
11-16 (2006) (maintaining that citizenship may still have a redemptive value succinctly captured by
the proposed construct of alien citizenship); see also Gordon, supra note 21.
53. While citizenship discourses are mainly found in political and social theory, they are
increasingly found in claims made within the legal sphere. See, Guy Mundlak, Litigating Citizenship
Beyond the Law of Return, in TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION TO ISRAEL IN GLOBAL COMPARATIVE
CONTEXT 51, 54-61 (Sarah S. Willen ed., 2007); BOSNIAK, supra note 52, at 77-101.
54. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 8-9 (1999).
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figure of the migrant. Proponents of migration and development emphasize
migrants’ positive economic contribution.55 Apparently in contrast, states
seeking to justify restrictive measures imposed on migrants address migration as threatening fundamental communal interests such as state sovereignty, national identity, or physical and economic security of a state’s polity.
Hence, migrants may be represented as cunning, resourceful, threatening or
otherwise capable of destabilizing state rule.56 Although the underlying
motivations for these representations may be diametrically opposed, they
both construct an image of migrants that is dramatically different from what
the status-based conception has offered. By emphasizing other attributes of
migrants, we receive a far more powerful image. From this vantage point,
migrants are certainly not fatally incapable of exercising meaningful agency.
Moreover, as some justifications for restrictive immigration practices suggest, these attributes are neither irrelevant for nor unnoticed by legal
mechanisms for migration regulation.
This insight underscores the function of a thin, status-based conception of
migrants in suppressing migrant agency. Sovereign states can create statusbased categories to classify, individuate, and check the transgressing capacity
of migrants. As we have seen, this conception and its disempowering effects
becomes the prism through which migrants are also conceived from a
rights-centered perspective.57 However, it also lays out the foundations for an
alternative conception of migrants that, unlike the ICRMW, is not restricted
to expressing migrants’ vulnerabilities.
Analogous to thick conceptions of citizenship, a thicker conception of
migrants identifies basic common characteristics of migrants and migration
without reducing them to the simple image generated and represented by
formal legal status. Such a conception is founded on agency rather than
status, linking attributes found along three main dimensions of migrants’
agency: vulnerability/resourcefulness; temporality/permanence of stay; and
political (in)capacity. These dimensions represent an understanding of migration as a dynamic process that involves crossing of legal and societal
boundaries and bears effect on the rights and political standing of migrants.58
*

55. DEMETRIOS PAPADEMETRIOU, DORIS MEISSNER, MARC ROSENBLUM & MADELEINE SUMPTION,
HARNESSING THE ADVANTAGES OF IMMIGRATION FOR A 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY (May 2009), available
at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/StandingCommission_May09.pdf.
56. See CAROLA SUÁREZ-OROZCO & MARCELO M. SUÁREZ-OROZCO, CHILDREN OF IMMIGRATION
36-65 (2002) (describing the variety of migrant experiences in light of stereotypical images of
migrants). For legal representations, see, for example, Cohen, supra note 47, at 372-82.
57. See CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALIZATION MEANS FOR
MIGRATION AND LAW 15-19 (2008) (addressing the predominance of illegality and “migration law’s
exclusionary capability” and criticizing the narrow image and perception of migrants they generate).
58. Cf. Nicholas Van Hear, Rebecca Brubaker & Thais Bessa, Managing Mobility for Human
Development: The Growing Salience of Mixed Migration (Human Development Research Paper No.
2009/20, April 2009), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19202/1/MPRA_paper_19202.pdf
(discussing the notion of mixed migration).
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Vulnerability/resourcefulness—The process of migration exposes migrants to vulnerability, whereby they leave their societies of origin to enter a
country in which they enjoy a limited degree of social support, social
benefits, and legal protection. Vulnerability may originate already in the
society of origin, and is sometimes the driving force behind migration. It can
further be exacerbated by the process of migration itself, as in cases of
trafficked persons or, in a different manner, of migrants smuggling across
borders. Where criminal activity develops around the crossing of closed
borders, migrants’ dependency in their exploiters is bound to increase.
But are all migrants innately vulnerable? Even if we disregard migrants
who are relatively well off, such as transnational corporate personnel,
professional experts and overseas graduate students,59 migration itself is
often indicative of the resourcefulness and adaptability of migrants. Compared with similarly-situated compatriots, left behind under the same economic or political conditions, those who made the journey may actually fair
better. Flourishing undocumented communities in many target countries,
sprawling transnational networks60 and involvement in the informal
economy61 all destabilize a simple image of migrant vulnerability. After a
closer look, one should come to wonder what substantial boundaries can be
drawn, for example, between a longtime student who does not plan to return
to her country of origin, personnel of international organizations or transnational corporations that have settled outside their country of origin, and a
relocated high-tech engineer.62
Temporality/permanence of stay—A fundamental aspect of migration that
status regularly veils is its inherent transitional nature. Legal status endeavors
to determine a particular temporality of stay for migrants and specify a
corresponding set of rights. It thus fails to account for the way that
migrants—particularly migrants in irregular status—effectively resist attempts to frame their presence. Even an inclusive approach to citizenship that
would grant migrants a permanent status does not necessarily capture the
59. The ICRMW art. 3 also disregards such migrants.
60. Migrant networks attract increasing ethnographic literature, which is illuminating in this
context, particularly with respect to its prospect of political mobilization. For recent illustrative
examples, see Philip E. Kelly, Transnationalism and Political Participation among Filipinos in
Canada, in ORGANIZING THE TRANSNATIONAL: LABOUR, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 215 (Luin
Goldring & Sailaja Krishnamurti eds., 2007); Patricia Landolt, The Transnational Geographies of
Immigrant Politics: Insights from a Comparative Study of Migrant Grassroots Organizing, 49 SOC.
Q. 53 (2008).
61. See JOANNE VAN DER LEUN, LOOKING FOR LOOPHOLES: PROCESSES OF INCORPORATION OF
ILLEGAL MIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS 55-58 (2003).
62. Note further how the ICRMW effectively includes contingent legal and political considerations in its non applicability clause: “The present Convention shall not apply to: (a) Persons sent or
employed by international organizations and agencies . . . whose admission and status are regulated
by general international law or by specific international agreements or conventions; (b) Persons sent
or employed by a State or on its behalf outside its territory who participate in development
programmes and other co-operation programmes, whose admission and status are regulated by
agreement with the State of employment and who, in accordance with that agreement, are not
considered migrant workers.” ICRMW, art. 3 (emphasis added).
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essence of migration or the wishes of migrants themselves. As studies of
transnational political participation show, migrants may be deeply interested
in maintaining ties with their home societies and are increasingly capable of
doing so.63
Shifting away from a statist perspective of legal status, notions of temporality and permanence are challenged. Migration can be understood both as a
movement towards incorporation in an established polity, or as a steady flow
of people, capital, culture and knowledge that interconnects polities and
economies. Through both theoretical and concrete policy measures, migrants’ transient nature can therefore be either suppressed or valued.64
Political (in)capacity—For many, migrant political participation presents
a contradiction in terms. This is manifest in the wide agreement both in
contemporary political theory and popular politics concerning the ineligibility of non-citizen migrant voting.65 However, examining this consensual
position in view of the status-based conception of migrants sheds a different
light on this truism. In deriving political participation from formal membership, a status-based duality between the migrant and the citizen is maintained. In this respect, identifying the chronic democratic deficit of migrants
who are excluded from participating in making rules that govern their lives
structurally situates non-citizen migrants outside the space of political
belonging and engagement. Consequently, attempts to include migrants by
extending or redefining the boundaries of citizenship have unintended
consequences. The focus on inclusion reaffirms the political incapacity of the
non-citizen migrant that remains in the realm of imposed status and in this
respect constitutes their political marginality.66
Making sense of political agency outside the commanding frameworks of
membership is difficult, at least as long as migrants are framed by the status
that identifies them. Yet, as historical precedents and ample examples in local
63. See Rainer Bauböck, Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Paricipation: A
Normative Evaluation of External Voting, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2393, 2399-2402, 2435-46 (2007)
(accounting for the proliferation of practices allowing external voting rights); see also SMITH &
BAKKER, supra note 2.
64. Alexander distinguishes between assimilationist and pluralist attitudes and policies towards
migrants, and considers the distinctive approach to the transient nature of migrants as central to his
typology of local migration policies. See MICHAEL ALEXANDER, CITIES AND LABOUR MIGRATION:
COMPARING POLICY RESPONSES IN AMSTERDAM, PARIS, ROME AND TEL AVIV 33-34, 41 (2007).
65. Even Walzer concedes this point. His claim that migrants “must be set on the road to
citizenship” goes part of the way, while confirming the difference vis-à-vis citizens in matters of
political participation. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALITY AND
EQUALITY 60 (1983). The convergence of otherwise contrasting “status-based and presence-based
conceptions of immigrant inclusion” at this point is an important basis for Bosniak’s critique of
Walzer’s “ethical territorialism.” Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of
Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 389, 391-94 (2007). To clarify, in the terms of the present
discussion, even what Bosniak considers “presence-based conceptions” of migrant inclusion can
espouse status-based conceptions of migrants.
66. See, e.g., Guy Mundlak, Industrial Citizenship, Social Citizenship, Corporate Citizenship: I
Just Want My Wages, 8 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 719 (2007) (exploring the idea of industrial citizenship
whereby migrants would be considered citizens by virtue of their economic contribution and
participation). See also Gordon, supra note 21.
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settings show, migrant participation is not at all untenable.67 Other venues of
political participation exist besides formal representative politics. From civil
society activity to unionizing, participation can take different forms. As we
have increasingly seen in recent years, it can even take the form of mass
protests that achieve public visibility.68 Emergent forms of migrant political
activity show how, in reality, migrants are not innately incapable of political
expression and participation.
*
These three dimensions draw the contours of a broad spectrum of migrant
agency. Under this conceptualization, performing migrant agency may often
be practically impossible, but it would remain theoretically available. An
agency-based conception shifts the focus from situating migrants within
predetermined spheres of status, which migrants enter and exit with no
ability to alter, to identifying meaningful expressions of migrant subjectivity.
This would require an elaborated effort to give concrete meaning to the
political concept of migrant subjectivity.69 When considering migrants as
agents, it is insufficient to address the migrant as “someone who is the
passive recipient of specific rights and who enjoys protection of the law.”70
Eventually, an agency-based conception of migrants cannot disregard
status, because status-based restrictions can successfully trump migrant
agency. Nevertheless, juxtaposing agency and status would still yield a
thicker conception of migrants. Categorization of migrants in view of an
agency-based conception would (a) be more cautious about decisions made
for migrants, providing that migrants can often express their preferences; 71

67. Historically, political participation was not restricted to citizens. See generally GERALD L.
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDER, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996).
Today, migrant participation in local politics is frequently allowed. For example, local participation is
partially integrated into the free movement regime of the European Union. See Russell J. Dalton,
Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation, 56 POL. STUD. 76 (2008). See also
Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at the Local Level, Strasbourg, Feb. 5,
1992, E.T.S. No. 144; MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: LEGAL STATUS, RIGHTS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (Rainer Bauböck ed., 2006).
68. The evident example is that of the 2006 immigrant marches across the United States. See,
e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects
for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (2007).
69. This can be achieved, for instance, by exploring the virtues of migrants’ subjectivity.
Compare this idea with the extensive exploration of citizens’ virtues in WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL
PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DUTIES IN THE LIBERAL STATE 221-24 (1991).
70. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE RETURN OF THE POLITICAL 69 (1993). This excerpt is from Mouffe’s
critical discussion of liberal citizenship (represented by Rawls) and civic republic citizenship, both
ultimately rejected in the process of introducing radical democratic citizenship. Mouffe’s own idea
links the definition of a citizen to the state (respublica) and is therefore not readily analogous to
migrant agency, yet her view of the content of the political concept remains relevant.
71. Examining possibilities of how to substantially involve migrants in ordering their preferences
requires a separate investigation. In the context of the present discussion, the particular legal form of
the IMBR is in this respect an unfortunate divergence from the ideal envisioned in T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms of Migration: Substance without Architecture, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND KEY CHALLENGES 467 (Ryszard Cholewinski,
Richard Perruchoud & Euan MacDonald eds., 2007). It is difficult to imagine that laymen could
easily discuss and debate the principled choices made by the drafters of the IMBR.
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(b) allow more flexible and overlapping categorizations; and (c) ultimately,
potentially change the ordering of rights afforded to migrants within immigration regimes.
IV. MIGRANTS CONCEPTIONS AND THE DEFINITION OF MIGRANTS
Translating the proposed distinction between status- and agency-based
conceptions of migrants into concrete normative guidelines is difficult. One
cannot simply introduce a new conception and reorient an established set of
norms, conceived under a different conception. This distinction is therefore
primarily a critical and heuristic device for unsettling unchallenged conventions. Hence, for example, thinking of migration as an enduring movement
across borders should lead us to question the basic premise identifying
migrants as persons who are outside their country of origin. Should people
preparing to leave, who have already made substantial familial or financial
commitments, be excluded from our understanding of migrants?72 On the
other end of the migration continuum, how should returning migrants be
regarded, and does it matter whether their return is seasonal or permanent?
Overall, looking at migrants’ agency may help to suspend the regular mode
of discussing migrants within the law to some extent. One may wish to avoid
methodological nationalism by accentuating the lifecycle of transnational
migration, but transnationalism alone does not render states and status
obsolete.73
The chief contribution of an agency-based conception of migrants to legal
instruments seeking to recapitulate migrants’ rights is to be found in its
endeavor to replace legally- and politically-based categories with a more
grounded and holistic view of migration than the one we encounter in
practice. Contrary to available international instruments that largely disre-

72. For example, the worldwide practice of paying onerous recruitment fees, often exposing
migrants to exploitative relationships, usually takes place before departure and therefore falls out of
the purview of instruments focusing on the condition of migrants after the crossing of borders.
Although this practice was identified as an issue of concern by drafters of the IMBR, it was ultimately
not addressed. For the contribution of such practices to creating and reinforcing migrant workers’
vulnerability, see HCJ 4542/02 Kav LaOved, supra note 45.
73. See Andreas Wimmer & Nina Glick Schiller, Methodological Nationalism and Beyond:
Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences, 2 GLOBAL NETWORKS 301 (2002)
(contesting the assumption that the nation state society is the natural social and political form of the
modern world, and addressing the conceptual limitations it places on research and thought in fields
such as migration). This critique, which has led to developing an idea of transnational migration, does
not ignore the material difference that crossing national borders makes in contemporary realities.
Despite many similarities, there remains both a conceptual and practical disparity between transnational and intrastate migrants. See also IMBR Network, International Migrants Bill of Rights:
Addendum, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 493 (2010). Indeed, as Frederick Schauer put it in his discussion of
the generalizing character of rules “[g]eneralizations are thus selective, but as selective inclusions
generalizations are also selective exclusions. In focusing on a limited number of properties, a
generalization simultaneously suppresses others, including those marking real differences among the
particulars treated as similar by the selected properties.” See FREDERICK SCHAUER, A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 21-22 (1993) (emphasis
original).
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gard personal motives and particularities, an agency-based perspective suggests that specific legal formulations should be more attenuated to a diversity
of personal experiences. This would require, at the outset, an adaptive
classification of migrants that does not succumb to preordained status-based
distinctions. Here I find the draft International Migrants Bill of Rights
(IMBR) provocative and insightful in proposing to define a migrant as “a
person who has left a State of which he or she is a citizen, national, or
habitual resident.”74
The wording allows for a thicker understanding of the condition of
migrants, which inescapably aims at a broader personal application than
other international instruments, most notably the ICRMW.75 This is also the
underling premise of Article 1 to the IMBR, as made clear in its commentary
(para. 17), that “migrants are entitled to human rights protections, regardless
of nationality, the cause of their migration and whether their presence is
lawful or irregular, temporary or longstanding.” In view of the agency-based
conception of migrants, such a choice enjoys a number of advantages.
First, under conditions where status plays an influential and constitutive
role in setting the background circumstances for migrants, the definition of
migrants is better distanced from definitions that already embed a given
balance and certain criteria for protection. Most significantly, formal statusbased distinctions between migrants should not be considered as the standard
baseline for rights allocation.76 This may also assist in reducing the volumes
of falsified claims aimed at attaining status-based protections.77 Second, the
broad definition abstains from reinforcing the image of the vulnerable

74. IMBR, art. 1. See also the wording of ¶ 9 to the IMBR’s preamble.
75. In temporal scope, the ICRMW extends more widely than the IMBR, by also applying to
migrants before departure. ICRMW art. 1(2), 2(1), provide, respectively, that (a) the convention
applies “during the entire migration process” spanning from preparation, through departure and
transit to return (art. 1(2)); and that (b) the definition of migrant worker includes persons prepared to
be engaged or have been engaged in remunerative activity outside their state of origin or habitual
residence (art. 2(1)). Conversely, the convention focuses on migrant workers (“engaged in a
remunerated activity”), relating differently to undocumented workers, and in general does not
challenge the conventional balancing of universal rights vs. state sovereignty. See Linda Bosniak,
Human Rights, State Sovereignty and the Protection of Undocumented Migrants under the International Migrant Workers Convention, 30 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 737, 742, 758 (1991).
76. Cf. IMBR art. 3 (non refoulment), 5 (removal) and 7 (asylum seekers), that all include
different protections against removal, that are intentionally broad and provide an opportunity to
recognize various vulnerabilities as a basis for granting relief from removal. Particularly, compare
art. 5.6 with art. 7.2.
77. Hence, linking specific benefits to age was criticized for instigating false claims for
protection that overburden specialized systems of protection and even for having dire unintended
consequences, such as encouraging family separation when unaccompanied children are entitled for
special protection. See, e.g., UNICEF, REFERENCE GUIDE ON PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF CHILD
VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING IN E UROPE 20 (2006), available at http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/
UNICEF_Child_Trafficking_low.pdf; UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN DEALING WITH UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN SEEKING ASYLUM (February 1997) s. 5.11), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3d4f91cf4.html. (underlining that immaturity, rather than formal criteria of
age, is the reason for providing sensitive treatment). Note that this reasoning may support a
recognition of particular vulnerabilities (e.g. children, victims of trafficking), but would remain
careful of creating classes on entitlements based on these characteristics.
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migrant, shaping migration regulation and migrants’ rights in particular in a
manner that does not undercut migrant agency predeterminately. The definition, which is the most explicit legal vehicle for constructing and transmitting
particular conceptions of migrants, has therefore also a positive role in
offering an opportunity to reorient discussions on the justification of migrants’ classification. Third, it would allow for diverse experiences as well as
competing understandings of the migration experience to take part in shaping
the substance of migrant subjectivity and the scope of migrants’ rights.
Fourth, the catch-all definition affords considerable space for balancing a
wide application of the IMBR’s provisions and state discretion. This may
offer states an opportunity to reexamine their migration regimes in consideration of the actual modes of migration they encounter. It may also facilitate
local deliberation and adaptation without the recurrent need to fit into a
readymade procrustean bed. In the face of an extremely versatile set of
human experiences and capabilities, a wide category may actually prove to
be more modest than any attempt to capture normatively relevant distinctions
between migrants within preconceived categories. This relatively open
texture may open spaces for creating sui generis provisions that are adaptable
for specific needs of migrants in particular conditions.78 Finally, there is a
subtle yet important idea that can be read into the active definition of the
migrants as “a person who has left.”79 By migrating, a person may be
exposed to vulnerabilities, but she may also be performing her personal
capacities. Legal instruments may therefore be utilized not only to remedy
migrants’ vulnerabilities, but also to enhance (or facilitate the enhancing of)
migrants’ capabilities.
Migration regimes, in local, national, regional and global spheres, are
under constant reconfiguration. As the pendulum of legal reforms moves on,
it is important to recognize the conceptual frameworks that structure the
commitment to migrant protection. For this purpose, a wide and flexible
definition of migrants that can accommodate an agency-based conception of
migrants suits better the complexity and diversity of migration. The IMBR
presents an opportunity to break away from previous attempts to square the
circle and open these multifaceted debates.

78.
79.

Cf. IMBR art. 8.
Previous versions of the IMBR read: “a person outside of a State . . . .” (emphasis added).

